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I. INTRODUCTION
onsumer bankruptcy law presents two basic choices to all personal
debtors who seek to have their debts discharged by bankruptcy.1
Although individuals are eligible to file under Chapter 11,2 and
although some may be eligible to file under Chapter 12, 3 Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 continue to be the two most viable options for most consumer
debtors. 4 Generally, Chapter 7 allows for the liquidation of the debtor's
non-exempt assets, the proceeds from which the trustee will use to pay
creditors. 5 Conversely, Chapter 13 allows the debtor to keep all of her
unsecured assets, but adhere to a payment plan under which she will attempt to repay her creditors over the next three to five years. 6 Superficially, Chapter 13 may sound appealing to many; in fact, according to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Chapter 13 bankruptcies accounted for about thirty percent of all filings for the year ending June 30,
8
1997. 7 Indeed, choosing it can be beneficial in some circumstances.
However, the 1997 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) notes, "For more than a decade, two-thirds of all Chapter
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (enumerating to whom each of the different bankruptcy
chapters applies). Naturally, debtors also may opt for non-bankruptcy courses of action to
alleviate indebtedness. See Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations
of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35
BUFF. L. REV. 177, 239 (1986). In fact, many debtors who seek the advice of an attorney
would be better advised not to file bankruptcy, but to pursue some other means of seeking
relief from their creditors, such as resisting garnishment, claiming exemptions from execution, or seeking protection under debt collection laws. See id. This Comment does not
address the problem of lawyers recommending bankruptcy when bankruptcy is unnecessary, but rather focuses on those debtors whose best option is to file bankruptcy but who
choose Chapter 13 when a Chapter 7 probably should have been recommended.
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994); see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166
(1991)(asserting that despite that Chapter 11 appears to be intended for business reorganizations, the plain language of § 109(b) does not exclude individuals, and thus personal
debtors may also file under the chapter).
3. Only a debtor who is a "family farmer with regular income" may file under Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (defining family farmer).
4. See generally KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 25-40 (1997) [hereinafter GRoss I]; WILLIAM C. HILLMAN, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: WHAT EVERY DEBTOR AND CREDITOR NEEDS TO KNOW Part 5
(1995).
5. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (incidentally outlining the general process of
Chapter 7 in listing the duties of the Chapter 7 trustee). See also discussion infra Part II.A
(contrasting Chapters 7 and 13).
6. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(b), 1322 (1994). See also discussion infra Part II.B
(contrasting Chapters 7 and 13).
7. See Edward Dufner, Cracking the Code: Bankruptcy Review Illuminates CreditorDebtor Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 16, 1997, at D1; see also Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts Official Website, (visited Feb. 19, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/
pressjreleases>.
8. See, e.g., Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 171 (1990) [hereinafter Gross II]. "Chapter 13 is particularly suited to the low asset/high income debtor [who can] generate
considerable repayment to creditors in a Chapter 13 case, whereas liquidation would yield
little recovery for creditors in Chapter 7." Id. at 171-72.
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13 plans have failed before the debtor completes payments." 9 Nevertheless, despite the substantial failure rate, a significant number of debtors
continue to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7.10 This Comment addresses why debtors continue to select plans under which statistically they
are more likely to fail than to succeed, why their lawyers allow such
choices to persist, and what can be done to cure the ailing Chapter 13.
The idealistic perception of the well-informed and well-educated
debtor making a detached decision based on her own particular needs
does not accurately portray the typical debtor's mental state when considering choice of chapter.1 1 Several consumer bankruptcy attorneys have
described debtors who are seeking bankruptcy as often feeling "dejected," "ashamed," "humiliated," "embarrassed," and struggling with
guilt, anger, and loss of self-esteem. 12 Also, for many debtors, bankruptcy follows some other stressful event in their lives, such as marital
break-up, loss of employment, or serious illness. 13 As a result, bankruptcy debtors tend to be in a distressed mental state and often are unaware of the full ramifications of their choice. 14 Furthermore, those who
actually do fully understand the differences between the two chapters
often tend to choose Chapter 13 based on unrealistic assumptions about
future ability to adhere to a budget.' 5 Such unrealistic assumptions and
inability to manage finances are often the very cause of the debtor's need
to file bankruptcy.' 6 Failure to make payments on the Chapter 13 plan
can then lead to dismissal of the bankruptcy' 7 or conversion into a Chapter 7, which usually involves additional costs.' 8 This ultimately results in
about half of all bankruptcies originally filed under Chapter 13 being dis9. The Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to Congress at 233

<http://www.nbrc.gov/facts.html> [hereinafter NBRC Report]. The NBRC was established
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, to
investigate and evaluate current aspects of the bankruptcy system and prepare a report
containing recommendations to Congress for improving the current bankruptcy system.
See NBRC Fact Sheet (last modified August 12, 1997) <http://www.nbrc.gov/facts.html>.
10. See ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., FED. JUD. WORKLOAD STAT., Dec. 1996, 68-9. In 1995

more than half of all filings in some districts were Chapter 13s.
11. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 540 (1993) [hereinafter Braucher I].
12. Id.; see also Bankruptcy Judges' Meeting Focuses on Review Commission Recommendations, BNA BANKR. LAW DAILY, Nov. 6,1997. The responses to a June, 1997, USA

Today/CNN poll that asked, "How do individuals who file for bankruptcy feel?" are indicative of the strong feelings bankruptcy evokes: "embarrassed," 77%; "depressed," 74%;
"scared," 70%; "ashamed," 66%; "angry," 55%; and "victimized," 37%. Id.
13. See Braucher I, supra note 11, at 540.
14. See id.

15. See Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Ethics: Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make
Their Own Informed Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 165, 181-82 (1997) [hereinafter Braucher II].
16. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 63

(1989) [hereinafter AWFOD].

17. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (1994). Dismissal essentially revests the property of the
estate in the debtor and allows creditors to pursue their claims as if the bankruptcy had
never been filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 349 (1994).

18. See id. § 1307(a) (providing for conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7).
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missed with no resolution of the debtors' financial problems. 19
When noncompletion leads to dismissal rather than discharge, as it
so often does, debtors exit the system having paid a substantial filing
fee and attorneys' fees but have not discharged any debt. Because
interest continues to accrue and compound on nondischarged debt,
the debtor may have an even higher debt load after making a20determined-but ultimately unsuccessful-effort to pay off debts.
In such cases the debtor would have been better advised to file a Chapter
7 originally, in which she probably would have received a discharge
2
within months of the filing. '
Scholars, politicians, and lobbyists have produced a number of theories
as to why the noncompletion rate in Chapter 13 is so high:
Some commentators suggest that debtors frequently encounter repeated financial difficulties or face new crises, such as the loss of a
job or a health emergency. Bankruptcy does not insulate against
subsequent disaster.... Others suggest that debtors propose unreal-

istic plans that are doomed from the inception sometimes in part due
to inadequate advice ....

Another theory holds that some debtors

file for Chapter 13 never intending to complete their payments; they
may cure a default on a secured debt on a home or car, then
leave
22
bankruptcy when their secured debt payments are current.
The high noncompletion rate notwithstanding, the general theory behind why debtors choose Chapter 13 is that those who attempt to repay
their debts will be "rewarded" by being able to keep even their non-exempt property. 23 Thus, theoretically, debtors are supposed to be induced
to choose Chapter 13 primarily because it allows them to keep all of their
unsecured assets. 24 However, debtors often make the choice independent of property considerations. 2 5 Consequently, other elements are involved besides the statutory benefits of each chapter that are causing
26
debtors to make their choices.
Many factors combine to "steer" unwary debtors into Chapter 13.27 A
number of people involved in the bankruptcy process stand to benefit
19. See Michael Bork & Susan D. Tuck, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Bankruptcy Statistical Trends: Chapter 13: Dispositions (Working Paper 2), Oct. 1994.
20. NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 234-35.

21. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 30 (noting that in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the
typical debtor receives a discharge four months from the date of filing).
22. NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 234.
23. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 240-41.
24. See id.
25. See generally id. at ch. 13. The authors, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, collected data showing that debtors are often not basing their
choice to file Chapter 13 on economic factors, but are steered in that direction by what
they call "local legal culture." See also, William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal
Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989) (noting that "[bly local legal culture [Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook] mean essentially that actors in the legal system 'steer' debtors towards one
chapter or the other").
26. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 252-54.
27. See id.; see also discussion infra Part Il1.
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from a debtor filing a Chapter 13.28 For example, the debtor's own attorney may greatly increase her financial gain if the debtor chooses Chapter
13 over Chapter 7.29 The proliferation of consumer bankruptcy lawyers
has led to intense competition in the area. 30 As a result, many of those
firms have evolved into virtual "bankruptcy factories," 3 1 which base their
success on a high volume, "cookie-cutter" style of practice. 32 Unlike filing Chapter 7, filing Chapter 13 increases the likelihood that a firm will
be paid for its services and thus can be more attractive for a firm that
practices nothing but consumer bankruptcy. 33 Additionally, "[l]awyers
frequently justify higher attorneys' fees in chapter 13 on the ground that
chapter 13 involves more work."'34 In this respect, "recommending chapter 13 is often the best way for a lawyer to make both a sale of services
'35
quickly and get the highest fee."
In filing more Chapter 13s than Chapter 7s, the debtor's attorney also
might stand to gain personally by increasing her standing with the local
Chapter 13 trustee or bankruptcy judge, either of whom may encourage
the choice based on personal moral or political beliefs. 36 The ideals of
the local trustees and judges greatly influence the number of Chapter 13s
filed in their districts, promulgating what has come to be known as "local
legal culture. '37 Public perception that Chapter 7 is a "free lunch" has
pressured public officials to show their political constituents that they will
hold "deadbeat debtors" accountable. 38 Even Congress has gotten into
the act with proposed bills that would make the highly unsuccessful
Chapter 13 mandatory in some cases. 39 The financial, moral, and political
influence of politicians and lobbyists on the national level and of judges,
trustees, and attorneys on the local level, combine to promote a system in
which debtors are urged into Chapter 13 when many, if not most, would
be better-advised to pursue a Chapter 7.40
This Comment addresses those concerns, working on the assumption
that the failure of most consumer debtors to effect a "fresh start" under
28. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 91.
29. See Braucher I, supra note 11, at 546.
30. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 236-37.
31. Many attorneys representing creditors and collection firms use the colloquial term
"bankruptcy factory" to describe such consumer bankruptcy firms.
32. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 229.
33. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 175. Often a Chapter 13 debtor's attorneys' fees
can become part of the payment plan, and "[h]aving debtors pay all or most of [their]
attorneys' fees in their Chapter 13 plans, rather than in advance, makes it easier for lawyers to make immediate sales of services." Id.
34. Id. at 176.
35. Id. at 173.
36. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 249.
37. See generally id. at 246-50. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook devised the term "local legal culture" to explain the discrepancies among districts that their research revealed.
See id. at 246.
38. See Kelly Smith, New Ways to Cut Americans' Debt, MONEY, Nov. 1997, at 32
(noting proposed reforms that are "likely to be in store for deadbeat debtors").
39. See discussion of proposed consumer bankruptcy legislation, infra Part IV.D.
40. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 247-48.
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Chapter 13 is a discouraging trend that damages the debtor personally
and impairs the integrity of the bankruptcy system. 41 Part II presents an
overview of the differences between a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. It analyzes those statutory factors upon which debtors
are supposed to be basing their decisions and identifies some common
misconceptions debtors tend to have about each of the chapters. 42 Part II
also sets forth some advantages and disadvantages debtors can potentially
realize by filing either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13.
Part III then examines the evidence that substantiates what factors actually affect those choices. It begins by addressing the role the debtor's
attorney plays in the decision-making process and evaluating the extent
to which some attorneys may be motivated to abuse this responsibility. It
then shifts the focus to other inherent aspects of the bankruptcy system
that influence how debtors perceive their options, such as the presence of
disparate "local legal cultures" that affect debtors both directly and
indirectly.
Finally, Part IV surveys several proposed models for correcting the current bankruptcy system and the practice of steering debtors into Chapter
13. Some of these reforms propose to prevent extraneous considerations
from affecting a debtor's decisions, while others see Chapter 13 as a solution, rather than as a problem. In any event, they represent a review of
the many workable theories and proposed models that abound on the
topic.
II.

ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER DEBTORS' PRIMARY
BANKRUPTCY CHOICES

Most consumer debtors encounter two practical options when seeking
to file bankruptcy-Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. 43 If the debtor happens to
meet the definition of a "family farmer," she may file under Chapter 12,4 4
but the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy debtors fail to satisfy the
requirements of that chapter. Individuals also may file bankruptcy under
Chapter 11, 4 5 which proposes a reorganization process somewhat similar
to that of Chapter 13.46 However, the Chapter 11 process is more expensive and more complicated than Chapter 13, and therefore remains a nonviable substitute. 47 Thus, bankruptcy law presents most individuals with
one practical choice-liquidate their debts under Chapter 7 or reorganize
41. Providing debtors with the ability to obtain a "fresh start" has been a longstanding
aspect of U.S. bankruptcy law. But see GRoss I, supra note 4, at 91 (noting, however, that
"[a] legal system could treat debtors in a myriad of ways, and the grant of a fresh start is by
no means a prerequisite of having a bankruptcy system").
42. This Comment does not attempt to analyze which chapter is fairer to creditors, but
rather examines what each chapter has to offer from a debtor's perspective.
43. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
44. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1994).
45. See id. § 109(d); see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991).
46. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1994).
47. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 26. Chapter 11 is most suitable for the needs of
consumer debtors when they do wish to reorganize rather than liquidate, but the amounts
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them under Chapter 13.48
A.

CHAPTER

7

Chapter 7 requires the debtor to liquidate all non-exempt assets 49 and
to disburse the proceeds to creditors. 50 The typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy
procedure involves the debtor initially meeting with her attorney and
either at that time, or at a later date, providing the attorney with the
information necessary to complete the requisite schedules.5 ' Once the
appropriate forms are filed to commence the action, the debtor must appear at a "section 341 meeting" where her creditors and the Chapter 7
trustee have the opportunity to gather information from the debtor as to
the nature of her indebtedness and amount of assets. 52 Most Chapter 7s

are "no asset" cases, meaning that once all of the property exemptions
are allowed the debtor has no non-exempt assets remaining with which to
repay her creditors. 53 Thus, the section 341 meetings are usually uneventful, with neither the creditors nor the trustee challenging any of the exemptions.5 4 Therefore, in the typical Chapter 7 case, after merely one or
two trips to the attorney's office and after answering a few questions at
the meeting of creditors, the debtor receives a discharge.5 5 However, the
discharge solves the debtor's problems only with unsecured creditors;
most Chapter 7 debtors have at least one secured creditor who will either
enforce payment or foreclose or repossess property. 56 Those debtors
must decide whether to try to pay their secured creditors, 57 sign reaffirof their debts exceed the Chapter 13 maximums of basically $250,000 of unsecured debt
and $750,000 of secured debt. See id. at 25-6; 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
48. See GRoss I, supra note 4, at 25.
49. The Bankruptcy Code lists a set of uniform federal property exemptions, but it
allows debtors to either choose those exemptions or to rely on state exemptions. See 11

U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994);

PETER A. ALCES & MARGARET HOWARD, CASES AND MATERIALS

77 (1995) [hereinafter ALCES & HOWARD]. Most states have "opted
out" of the federal exemptions entirely, leaving debtors in those states with only state
exemptions. See ALCES & HOWARD at 77.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994) (detailing the procedures and priorities involved in distributing the property of the debtor's estate).
51. See HILLMAN, supra note 4, at 11-12.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1994).
53. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON THE
ON BANKRUPTCY

JUDICIARY,

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

BANKRUPTCY

REFORM

ACT

OF

1978: A

56-57 (1983) (noting that 97% of all chapter 7s filed are no
asset cases); see also Susan D. Kovac, Judgment Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991).
54. "Typically the questioning is not intense and the meeting is brief." HILLMAN,
supra note 4, at 36; see AWFOD, supra note 16, at 27.
55. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 33 (noting that "[t]he entire Chapter 7 process
takes roughly four months for most debtors," and most never have to appear before a
BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK

judge).
56. See id. at 31 (calculating that the average Chapter 7 debtor has three secured
creditors).
57. This process of "redemption" allows the debtor to be able to keep secured property "by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim." 11 U.S.C.
§ 722 (1994). Because redemption requires that the debtor pay the debt, it is not a viable
alternative in most cases, particularly those that are no-asset.
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mation agreements, 58 or surrender the secured property. 59
In theory, then, the debtors who are best suited for Chapter 7 are those
60
who have little or no non-exempt assets and few secured creditors.
Thus, the debtor's income would appear not to matter. However, judges
have the power to declare a "substantial abuse" of the bankruptcy system
if a Chapter 7 debtor appears to have a sufficient income with which she
could have repaid her debts under Chapter 13.61 In determining whether
"substantial abuse" has occurred, a bankruptcy judge will often look the
ratio of debt to income. 62 Thus, many debtors may opt for the less successful Chapter 13 for fear that their level of income precludes them from
receiving a discharge under Chapter 7.
Chapter 7 does present the debtor with several statutory disadvantages.
First, once a debtor has received a discharge under Chapter 7, that debtor
63
is prohibited from receiving another Chapter 7 discharge for six years.
Also, filing Chapter 7 subjects any cosigners to payment of the debt,
64
which often involves discourse in a personal or familial relationship.
Undoubtedly, the greatest drawback to filing under Chapter 7 results
from the very nature of liquidation-that the debtor will lose all nonexempt assets. Of course, this aspect is painless for almost all Chapter 7
65
debtors because most have no non-exempt assets to lose. Thus, most
bankruptcy debtors are immune from the sting of liquidation.
In sum, Chapter 7 contains some disincentives and is not available to
all debtors, but provides a simple method for debtors with little or no
66
non-exempt assets to obtain relief.

58. If the debt is reaffirmed, however, it becomes nondischargeable in the bankruptcy
proceeding, and the debtor could ultimately lose the property if she fails to make payments
under the reaffirmation agreement. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994). Furthermore, due in
part to the much-publicized abuse of reaffirmation by several large creditors, many consumer groups, as well as the NBRC, have suggested that Congress entirely do away with
reaffirmation as an option. See NBRC Report, supra note 9.
59. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 31-32.
60. See, e.g., Gross II, supra note 8, at 171 (stating that on its face, liquidation is best
suited for the "low asset/low income" debtor and the "high asset/low income" debtor). A
prototypical debtor of this type would be one who, like many consumer debtors in the
United States, owes excessive amounts in the form of revolving credit debt, particularly
credit card debt. See Dufner, supra note 7, at D10.
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994); see also Gross II, supra note 8, at 167 (likening the
practice of judges limiting debtors to Chapter 13 to unconstitutionally subjecting debtors to
peonage, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment).
62. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 939 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Green v.
Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the fact that the
debtor had income in excess of his necessary expenses was not "a sufficient basis for a
finding that the debtor has in fact substantially abused the provisions of Chapter 7").
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1994); Kaufhold v. Cauthen (In re Cauthen), 152 B.R.
149, 152 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
64. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 103.
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66. See generally AWFOD, supra note 16, at 33.
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Whereas Chapter 7 is a "liquidation" procedure, Chapter 13 is a process of "reorganization," whereby debtors subject themselves to new payment terms under which they commit all disposable income 67 to the
satisfaction of their debts for three to five years. 68 Thus, Chapter 13, the
"wage earner" plan requires that a debtor have a steady income, but allows a debtor to retain non-exempt, unsecured property. 69 Procedurally,
filing a Chapter 13 requires the same income and property disclosures
and the same section 341 meeting as filing a Chapter 7; however, in filing
a Chapter 13, the debtor also must propose a payment plan, 70 which must
meet the statutory requirements of section 1322 for the court to approve
it.71 Approval by the unsecured creditors is unnecessary, but they can
72
object to its confirmation if it fails to satisfy the statutory minimums.
As for secured claims, either (1) the secured creditor must accept the
plan; (2) the debtor must surrender the collateral; or (3) the debtor must
propose to pay the secured creditor the present value of the collateral
over the life of the plan. 73 These options for payment of secured creditors notwithstanding, every Chapter 13 payment plan must also set out to
pay general unsecured creditors at least what they would have received if
the debtor had undertaken a Chapter 7 plan. 74 This is the so-called "best
interests" test. 75 This test is conjunctive with the "best efforts" disposable
income test of section 1325(b). A final requirement of the payment plan
76
is that it must be proposed in good faith.
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1994).
'Disposable income' means income which is received by the debtor which is
not reasonably necessary to be expended- (A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and (B) if the debtor is
engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
Id. § 1325(b)(2). The debtor must commit all such income to the plan unless 100% payment can be achieved with less. See id. § 1325(b)(1)(A). This disposable income rule, often
called the "best efforts" test, does not apply unless the trustee or a creditor objects to the
debtor's proposed plan. See id. § 1325(b)(1); In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.

1986).

68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994). Subsection (d) contains the three to five years
requirement.
69. See id.
70. See id. § 1321. (Repealed)
71. In addition to outlining what may be included in a plan, § 1322 mandates that the
plan shall, subject to certain qualifications, (1) "provide for the submission ... of future
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee;" (2) provide for full
payment of all priority claims; and (3) "provide the same treatment for each claim within a
particular class." § 1322.
72. See GRoss I, supra note 4, at 30.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A)-(C) (1994); Asociates Commer. Corp. v. Rash (In re
Rash), 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994).
75. See In re Jackson, 173 B.R. 168, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). For example, "[i]f a
debtor has only exempt property, so that the case would be a no asset case in chapter 7,
then unsecured creditors need not be paid anything in chapter 13 to meet the 'best interests' test." Braucher I, supra note 11, at 531.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994).
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The statutory requirements as to the order of payments in Chapter 13
mandate that first, secured creditors must be paid in accordance with one
of the three options outlined in § 1325(a)(5); then priority unsecured
creditors must be paid; 77 and finally, other unsecured creditors must be
paid. 78 The actual percentage amount unsecured creditors get paid on
their claims depends upon what the debtor 79 sets forth in the initial plan,
which, in turn, is usually based upon the "requirements" of the local
bankruptcy judge.80 Thus, a debtor filing a Chapter 13 in one district may
be expected to undertake a much higher-percentage plan than a debtor in
a neighboring district. 81 Chapter 13 also provides the statutory advantage
of allowing debtors to restructure payment, 82 thereby giving them the
ability to avoid repossession of assets by secured creditors. 83 Other advantages include being able to protect cosigners from the debt 84 and being able to satisfy an obligation to repay, which may morally or
85
psychologically gratify a debtor's conscience.
Conversely, the facially apparent disadvantage of filing Chapter 13 is
that the debtor must commit all disposable income to the plan. 86 Furthermore, as addressed in Part III, more than half of all debtors who file
Chapter 13 never realize the statutory advantages because they fail to
receive a discharge under the chapter. 87 Additionally, some debtors may
file Chapter 13 under the faulty assumption that they will receive a more
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994). Priority claims include, among other things, debts
owed to certain tax entities and debts in the form of support payments to children and
former spouses. See id.
78. See § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1994); Braucher I, supra note 11, at 531; see also supra, note
53 and accompanying text.
79. This figure in the debtor's plan is usually not calculated by the debtor, however,
but either directly calculated by the debtor's attorney or tailored by the trustee. See
AWFOD, supra note 16, at 37.
80. See id.
81. See id. This aspect of bankruptcy law further substantiates the theory of local legal
culture. See id. at 247-49; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
83. Debtors can restructure payments of all secured claims except for a secured claim
for which the debtor's primary residence is collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
Thus, mortgage payments must continue under the plan as they were originally arranged.
See id. Because most bankruptcy debtors who possess homes own them subject to a mortgage, debtors consistently encounter difficulty in this area when trying to manage their
budgets and adhere to their payment plans. See In re Neverla, 194 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1996). However, despite the lack of relief bankruptcy provides for home mortgage payments, it is common practice for debtors to file bankruptcy on the eve of home
foreclosure to take advantage of the automatic stay and avoid losing their home, at least
temporarily.
84. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 103.
85. See id. at 94-5.
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1994). For a discussion of what constitutes "disposable
income," see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
87. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 215-17. Those debtors usually convert to Chapter
7, lose all of the non-exempt assets that they had originally hoped to keep, and fall years
behind where they would have been had they filed Chapter 7 originally. See Whitford,
supra note 25, at 92-3.
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favorable credit rating than from Chapter 7.88 However, credit reporting
agencies usually do not report a Chapter 13 filing differently than a Chap89
ter 7 filing.
In any event, Chapter 13 provides a debtor with non-exempt assets and
a steady income a method for alleviating indebtedness without losing her
assets. 90 However, it also requires that the debtor commit substantially
more time and effort in order to receive a discharge than does Chapter 7,
and moreover, Chapter 13 debtors fail to receive a discharge substantially

more often than do debtors in Chapter 7.91
III. EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING
DEBTORS' CHOICES
A.

THE ROLE OF THE DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY

The complexity of bankruptcy law practically ensures that a debtor attempting to file bankruptcy will seek advice from an attorney. 92 Undoubtedly, the influence of a bankruptcy debtor's attorney significantly
affects the debtor's choice of chapter.93 In most cases, the debtor is unacquainted with the bankruptcy system, and the attorney provides the
debtor with her first explanation of her options. 94 This gives the debtor's
attorney tremendous power to affect how the debtor will view her
choices, and the attorney abuses this responsibility if she moves beyond
merely providing information and counseling in the debtor's best interests to presenting the information in a subjective light to promote the
lawyer's own benefit. 95
A number of scholars have proposed theories as to why a debtor's attorney would want to encourage the debtor to file under Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7.96 Most of these theories center around the idea that
88. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 34. Additionally, some feel that debtors who receive a discharge under Chapter 13 feel less "stigmatized" than debtors who declare "true"
bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 95.
89. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 291. "Not only do credit reports provide incomplete information regarding a debtor's repayment attempts, but according to many
accounts, Chapter 7 debtors have easier access to credit than Chapter 13 debtors." Id. at
236. The fact that credit reporting agencies do not identify debtors who make substantial
payments from those who do not was so troubling to the NBRC that its Report recommends that Congress amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1994),
to require reporting agencies to distinguish between the types of bankruptcy filings. See
NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 291-92; see also infra Part IV.C.2.
90. See Braucher I, supra note 11, at 530-31.
91. See id.
92. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 235. The differing interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code among districts increases debtors' reliance on legal advice. See discussion
infra Part III.B and accompanying notes 130-150. "An overlay of divergent local interpretations onto the already complex Chapter 13 system creates a situation in which expert
legal advice is necessary to develop, confirm, modify, and complete a Chapter 13 plan."
NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 235.
93. See Braucher I, supra note 11, at 503.
94. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 20.
95. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 168-69.
96. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 90-91.
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the lawyer will receive a greater financial gain by steering the debtor into
Chapter 1.3.97 One reason lawyers often make more money by managing
a Chapter 13 than a Chapter 7 is that the typical Chapter 13 generally
requires more work, and the lawyer can therefore justify charging more
in fees. 98 Because most Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases and uneventful, they require minimal need for outside assistance, such as advice from
an attorney. 99 However, the possibility of being able to receive a slightly
higher fee is only a mild incentive. Additionally, bankruptcy courts monitor the amounts attorneys charge debtors in fees. 10 0 Section 329 of the
Bankruptcy Code states, "[I]f such compensation exceeds the reasonable
value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or
order the return of any such payment." 10 1 Courts in most districts have
calculated what they consider to be reasonable amounts that attorneys
can charge for handling different types of bankruptcies, and those figures
are made available to attorneys. 10 2 Each figure represents the maximum
amount an attorney may charge for a particular type of bankruptcy barring special circumstances. 10 3 The amounts vary by district, and have
come to be known by bankruptcy practitioners as minimum amounts
rather than maximums. 10 4 The discrepancy between the maximum allowed for a Chapter 13 and that allowed for a Chapter 7 is usually too
10 5
minimal to have a significant impact in most districts.
Another reason lawyers may make more money by handling mostly
Chapter 13s is that intense competition has led to the need for extreme
06
efficiency in order for consumer bankruptcy firms to be profitable.'
The proliferation of lawyers who handle consumer bankruptcy has led to
the intense competition. 1 °7 As a result, many of those firms have essentially become "bankruptcy factories," which base their success on a high

97. See id. at 91.
98. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 175 (stating that "[flee considerations may make
the lawyer only too ready to encourage filing in Chapter 13 even though Chapter 7 may be
more realistic and a better financial deal for the debtor"). A typical consumer bankruptcy
attorney may charge "from $400 for the simplest Chapter 7 liquidations to $1,300 for more
complicated five-year Chapter 13 reorganizations." Robin Fields and Stacey Singer, Lawyers, Ads Influence Decisions, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1997, at 19A.
99. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 172-73.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994) (requiring debtors' attorneys to file for the court's review a statement of compensation paid or to be paid).
101. Id.
102. See Braucher I, supra note 11, at 546.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. Although the variance of fees from district to district likely does not influence the debtor's attorney, it does contribute to the complexity of the bankruptcy process
in general and provides an example of the adverse effects of local legal culture. See discussion, infra Part Itl.B; see also Kovac, supra note 53, at 679 n.28 (noting Chapter 7 fees
ranging from $100 to $750).
106. See Neustadter, supra note 1,at 236-37.
107. See id.
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volume of work that can be administered by low-level employees. 10 8 "In
a specialty in which high volume equals high profit, the battle for clients
is becoming more and more cutthroat." 10 9 Bankruptcy factories thrive on
the routine, organizing and working on their cases as if they were products on an assembly line. 1 10 Also, many attorneys find that high volume
is necessary because of the abundance of non-lawyer services offered to
bankruptcy debtors.1 1 "A growing army of paralegals, legal assistants
for customers willing to
and document preparers do cut-rate filings
' 12
chance representing themselves in court.'
For a firm that practices nothing but consumer bankruptcy, ensuring
that the firm's clients can pay their attorneys' fees is imperative. Methods
of ensuring that Chapter 13 debtors are able to pay their attorneys' fees
differ around the country. 1 3 "Some courts treat attorneys' fees as administrative expenses. Other courts will stretch out attorneys' fees through
the life of the plan. Still others allow certain plan payments to be applied
exclusively to attorneys' fees.' 14 Regardless of which method a bankruptcy court applies, attorneys are more likely to be paid when their clients file under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.115
In addition to allowing financial considerations to influence the choice
of chapter, the debtor's attorney may attempt to impose her own moral
beliefs that repayment is the "right" thing to do. 116 Most states' rules of
professional conduct do not draw a bright line defining the point at which
giving such advice becomes a violation. 117 For example, Rule 2.1 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.' 1 8 Undoubtedly, some personal bankruptcy lawyers allow
those types of considerations to seep into the advice they give. 11 9 A lawyer's belief that an individual should not automatically be able to get a
108. See id. at 229; see also Kovac, supra note 53, at 755 (noting that "low fees and high
volume allow [bankruptcy attorneys] to survive in a market only minimally affected by the
quality of representation").
109. Fields and Singer, supra note 98, at 19A (citing as an example of the competitive
tactics used in the area one bankruptcy lawyer's use of public records to identify homeowners in foreclosure in order to send direct mail soliciting services).
110. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 236-37.
111. See Fields & Singer, supra note 98, at 19A.
112. Id.
113. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 272.
114. Id. (citations omitted). In any event, "[a] debtor's attorney's fees are an administrative expense entitled to priority payment." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 503(a)
300.72 (15th ed. 1997).
115. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 175. But cf NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 27273 (noting one attorney's comment that some courts do not sufficiently account for the
additional time necessary to adequately represent a debtor in Chapter 13 as opposed to in
Chapter 7).
116. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Proper Role of the
Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783, 791-93 (1995).
117. See id. at 791.
118. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1995).
119. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 249-50.
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"free lunch" and should be encouraged to try to repay her debts likely
frames the lawyer's recommendation to the client in many cases and un120
duly influences a debtor to make a bad choice.
Congress has responded to attorneys who abuse the bankruptcy system
in this manner by implementing policing mechanisms in an attempt to
provide debtors with protection by regulating debtors' attorneys. 121 For
example, the fees charged by the debtor's attorney are subject to scrutiny
by the bankruptcy judge. 122 Additionally, debtors' attorneys are now required to file a declaration with the bankruptcy court that states, "I have
informed the petitioner that (he or she) may proceed under Chapter 7 or
13 of [the Bankruptcy Code], and have explained the relief available
under each such chapter. ' 123 Also, not only must the debtor's attorney
provide a thorough discussion of the available alternatives, but the bankruptcy clerk is also required to give written notice to all consumer debtors
indicating each chapter under which they may file. 124 However, providing such information likely accomplishes little if, for example, the
debtor's lawyer frames the conversation for her own benefit, thereby controlling the subject matter of an otherwise thorough presentation of the
alternatives. 125 The most recent policing mechanisms were enacted as
part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.126 Making numerous adjustments to Code provisions regarding compensation of bankruptcy attorneys, the 1994 amendments codified several additional factors courts
should consider when evaluating whether a bankruptcy attorney's compensation is "reasonable," including, among other things, "the time spent
27
on the services [provided]" and "the rates charged for the services."'
In sum, the debtor's attorney plays a key role in determining under
which bankruptcy chapter the individual will file. It seems that some
bankruptcy lawyers influence debtors to choose Chapter 13 intentionally
and systematically as a matter of practice, perhaps often fully aware that
reorganization is not the best option. 128 Conversely, there are some lawyers who may be steering debtors into Chapter 13 unintentionally, by reflecting a belief that attempting to pay is always the right choice 129 or by
120. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 166.
121. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 327-330 (1994).

122. See 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994).
123. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No, 98-353,
§ 322, 98 Stat. 333, 357 (codified in scattered sections of Title 11 of the United States
Code).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 342 (1994).
125. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 249. Also, requiring an attorney merely to inform
a debtor of her choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is ineffective in informing the
debtor of her non-bankruptcy alternatives. See id. at 250.
126. See Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (now codified in various sections of Title 11
of the United States Code).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (1994); see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, $ 330.LH[5], pp.
330-73 to 330-77 (15th ed. 1997).
128. See Neustadter, supra note 1, at 239-40.
129. See Braucher II, supra note 15, at 167.
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catering to the desires of local bankruptcy officials. 130 No matter the reason, however, bankruptcy attorneys remain an integral component in a
system in which debtors are continually meeting with failure as a result of
a poor legal choice.
B.

EFFECTS OF LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE

Bankruptcy law is far from being uniform.1 3 1 Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook devised the term "local legal culture" to explain the discrepancies in bankruptcy practice in different areas of the country.1 32 The
NBRC further substantiated the findings in its analysis of the effects of
local legal culture on Chapter 13 bankruptcy:
The Commission hearings were peppered with illustrations of the
lack of uniformity in Chapter 13 plan confirmation requirements.
Court discretion is an important and necessary part of any judicial
proceeding, and judges must be called upon to apply legal rules to
novel and perplexing sets of facts. However, the nonuniformity of
Chapter 13 plans is more deeply rooted. Chapter 13 practices differ
dramatically from state to state, district to district, and even from
judge to judge in the same district. Debtors in very similar circumstances encounter extremely different Chapter 13 systems. These
variations in the systems determine whether debtors are eligible for
Chapter
13 relief at all and how much they will have to pay for that
133
relief.
The Commission's report goes on to examine the effects of the discrepancies, noting that the divergent interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code
add to the complexity of the bankruptcy process, thus increasing a
debtor's need for legal advice, which the majority of debtors cannot afford.13 4 Furthermore, "the debtors who end up in the complicated Chapter 13 system without good advice are unlikely to be able to navigate their
way through the process. 1 35 Consequently, the effects of local legal culture may inappropriately cause debtors to file under Chapter 13 and, being unable to obtain needed advice, ultimately fail to complete the
6
plan. 13
Local legal culture not only adds to the complexity of the bankruptcy
system, but it also causes regional discrepancies due to the personal beliefs of local judges, trustees, and lawyers.' 37 Many people feel that attempting to repay one's debts through Chapter 13 is the morally right
thing to do as opposed to getting a "free lunch" in Chapter 7.138 Conse130. See discussion, infra Part III.B (analyzing the effects of "local legal culture" on
personal debtors in bankruptcy).
131. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 247.
132. See id.
133. NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 235.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See generally AWFOD, supra note 16, at 248-51.
138. See id.
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quently, if the local bankruptcy judge frowns upon an attorney filing
under Chapter 7, that judge is effectively limiting a debtor's options in
that district. 1 39 In that way, the personal beliefs of the local bankruptcy
judges and trustees can affect the practice of consumer bankruptcy attorneys. 140 "Because a consumer bankruptcy lawyer commonly practices
within a limited geographic range before a limited set of judges, lawyers
may sometimes have an incentive to satisfy the judge rather than the
41
client."1
Indeed, some argue that this local implementation of personal beliefs is
a public good. 142 Some theorists believe that when a public value is implicated in a bankruptcy case judges should be able "to employ their experience, intelligence, and sensitivity to effectuate change to meet the
needs of a society," relying principally on the public value in reaching a
143
decision and placing less emphasis on the text of statutes.
On the other hand, many critics of the current bankruptcy system have
denounced this practice in which local bankruptcy officials use their
power to implement their own ideas of social policy. 1 44 One scholar has
taken a constitutional approach to challenging the steering of debtors
into Chapter 13.145 Her argument suggests that the practice of judges
disallowing debtors from filing Chapter 7 bankruptcies may violate the
146
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.
She suggests that if the bankruptcy system forces a debtor to work to pay
her creditors, which is what results from prohibiting a debtor from filing a
Chapter 7, then the system is promoting "debt labor," which was what
Congress intended to prohibit by placing the phrase "involuntary servi147
tude" in the Thirteenth Amendment.
Another critic has condemned the practice of local bankruptcy officials
steering debtors into Chapter 13 on the grounds that forced reorganizations are likely to weaken the debtor's spirit, thereby vitiating the willingness to work diligently to achieve the payments under the plan. 148 "As a
psychological matter, choice is important to individuals. It enables a
debtor to become an active participant in determining his or her own
destiny, and that facilitates maximum recovery."'1 49 Following this line of
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. GRoss I, supra note 4, at 119.
142. See Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12

BANKR.

DEV. J.

645, 701 (1996).
143. Id. at 702.
144. See, e.g., Braucher I, supra note 11, at 556-57.
145. See Gross II, supra note 8, at 166-67.
146. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude.., shall
exist within the United States." Id.; see Gross II, supra note 8, at 166-67.
147. See Gross II, supra note 8, at 167. "Requiring a debtor to work to repay his creditors to obtain a discharge is strikingly close to the condition of peonage, a form of involuntary servitude violative of the thirteenth amendment." Id. Stated simply, "[p]eonage is the
prohibited condition in which individuals are forced to work to repay their creditors." Id.
148. See GROSS I, supra note 4, at 119.
149. Id.
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reasoning, by steering debtors into Chapter 13, bankruptcy officials may
of debtors, which is precisely
actually be encouraging non-accountability
150
avoid.
to
trying
were
they
what
IV.
A.

PROPOSED REMEDIES
REPEALING CHAPTER

13

At least one critic has suggested that Chapter 13 should be repealed
entirely. 15 1 The argument that entirely repealing the chapter presents the
most workable solution to the problem "rests on the assumption that it is
not practical to alter existing bankruptcy practice so that most consumers
make an informed and self-interested choice between Chapters 7 and
13."152 Proponents of repealing the chapter argue that the only other

alternative would be to appoint independent officials to monitor all new
Chapter 13s to decide which are improperly filed or likely to fail. 153 Such
a task, they argue, would be unmanageable and cost-prohibitive. 154 Concededly, repealing Chapter 13 would be a potential solution only if Chapter 13 were unnecessary in the current scheme. 155 One author, William
C. Whitford, set out to prove just that, identifying eight principal reasons
most debtors choose Chapter 13, and then arguing how those so-called
benefits are illusory, or could be attained otherwise.1 56 According to
Whitford, the reasons a debtor would choose Chapter 13 are that she
wants or needs: (1) to repay her debts; (2) to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy; (3) to have a debt discharged that would not be dischargeable
under chapter 7; (4) to avoid the six-year bar on Chapter 7 filings; (5) to
avoid repossession of a secured asset by restructuring payments; (6) to
avoid foreclosure on a home by curing late mortgage payments; (7) to
keep non-exempt property; and (8) to protect cosigners from the collec57
tion efforts of creditors.1
Whitford goes on to argue how each of these attributes that may be
enticing to a debtor either may be attained without filing in Chapter 13 or
currently is not necessarily feature of the chapter. 158 First, nothing currently prevents a debtor from fulfilling a moral desire to repay debt under
Chapter 7.159 She can voluntarily repay a debt after receiving a discharge1 60 or sign a reaffirmation agreement, that allow her to restructure
150. See id. "Moreover, individuals may not work as hard at repayment if they must
work by force rather than by choice." Id. at 39.
151. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 104.
152. Id. at 88.
153. See id. at 93. The NBRC has recommended just such a system, wherein positions
would be created with the sole function of monitoring Chapter 13s filed for fraud.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 94.
156. See id.
157. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 94.
158. See id. at 94.
159. See id. at 94-5.
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(f) (1994).
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the debt, which will not be discharged. 161 Second, as for the belief that by
filing Chapter 13 a debtor will avoid the stigma of bankruptcy, the difference in stigma in most communities between those who file Chapter 7
and those who file Chapter 13 is virtually non-existent. 162 Third, being
able to discharge some debts in Chapter 13 that are non-dischargeable in
Chapter 7,163 as a feature of Chapter 13 implemented solely as an incentive for choosing the chapter, is counter to public policy because it requires those few creditors whose debts are discharged to shoulder the
burden of default, rather than spreading the burden to all creditors collectively. 164 Fourth, filing Chapter 13 to avoid the six-year bar in Chapter
7 affords an argument similar to the one against having a "superdischarge," in that the available data suggest that debtors do not abuse
bankruptcy in the way that the bar is supposed to be shielding against.
Thus, the six-year bar itself is likely unnecessary. 165 Fifth, being able to
redeem secured property by installments rather than being forced to do
so in one lump sum should be available to debtors who have filed under
both chapters as a standard bankruptcy feature for dealing with secured
creditors.1 66 Similar to the argument made against the superdischarge,
this aspect of Chapter 13 has no reason for its existence other than to
make Chapter 13 more enticing than Chapter 7, and thus would be unnecessary if Chapter 13 were repealed. 167 Sixth, as with the preceding
argument, the policy for allowing a debtor to prevent foreclosure would
be unessential if Chapter 13 were repealed.1 68 Seventh, because of the
"best interests" rule that creditors must receive from Chapter 13 at least
what they would have received had the debtor filed a Chapter 7, an informed debtor will choose Chapter 13 to preserve non-exempt property
only when the property is worth more to her than its value would be to a
creditor, such as when the property has some sentimental value.169 A
better solution than the discrepancy between the chapters would be an
amendment to the exemption laws to ensure that all debtors could protect such property regardless in which chapter they filed. 170 Eighth, in
practice, a Chapter 7 debtor can currently protect cosigners from creditor
161. See id. § 524(c).
162. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 95-6. Additionally, credit reporting agencies usually do not report a Chapter 13 filing differently than a Chapter 7 filing. See NBRC Report,
supra note 9, at 291; see also AWFOD, supra note 16.
163. This is known as a "superdischarge." See Whitford, supra note 25, at 96.
164. See id. at 96-7. "[W]hat justification is there for rewarding an undeserving creditor ... if a debtor fails to elect Chapter 13?" Id. at 97.
165. See id. at 98-9. Plus, debtors who repeatedly file bankruptcy usually do not do so
in order to receive multiple discharges, but to obtain the benefits of the automatic stay to
hinder their creditors. See id. at 98.
166. See id. at 100-01.
167. See id. at 101.
168. See id. Additionally, "[i]f the purpose of treating the Chapter 13 debtor specially
with regard to home mortgage arrearages is to provide incentives to file Chapter 13, it is
difficult to justify sacrificing the rights of some creditors (mortgagees), for the benefit of
others who will collect more under Chapter 13." Id.
169. See id.at 102.
170. See Whitford, supra note 25, at 103.
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process, and thus, Chapter 13 is unnecessary to achieve this result. 17 1
"Providing [that] the debtor has sufficient regular income to make future
payments-and if she does not, then she is not a fit candidate for Chapter
13 anyway-she can offer the creditor with rights against a cosigner a
reaffirmation, conditioned on agreement to postpone collection against
'1 72
the cosigner.
In response to the proposal to repeal Chapter 13, one author has noted,
"It seems more useful to consider how to create greater national uniformity. It would be worth focusing, for example, on the role both lawyers
and judges play in debtor choice before deciding to eliminate the
choice."'1 73 Repealing Chapter 13 is undeniably one of the more radical
proposals on how to solve its current problems. Much of American society has grown accustomed to having the choice between liquidation or
reorganization. Moreover, because creditors are typically paid more on
their claims in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7,174 and given the strength
and influence of the consumer credit lobby, Congress will not likely repeal Chapter 13 in the near future. Indeed, not only does the consumer
credit lobby not want Chapter 13 to be repealed, it urges Congress to
75
make it mandatory in some cases.'
B.

CREATING GREATER NATIONAL UNIFORMITY

A more common cry from bankruptcy reformists is for prevention of
geographic discrepancies in the application of consumer bankruptcy law
and alleviation of the negative implications of local legal culture. 176 According to its proponents, fostering greater national uniformity would
keep local bankruptcy officials and attorneys from being able to so
177
greatly influence the number and types of filings in their districts.
In an effort to create more "bright line" standards in bankruptcy law
for local officials to follow, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
recommended to Congress that payments on unsecured debt should be
determined by national guidelines. 17 8 Under the current system, payments to unsecured creditors are largely determined by the "best efforts"
179
requirement that the debtor commit all disposable income to the plan.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. GRoss I, supra note 4, at 119 (emphasis added). As for the suggestion of creating
"greater national uniformity," see discussion, supra Part IV.B.
174. See ALCES & HOWARD, supra note 48.
175. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong.; The Responsible
Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Act of.1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. See also infra Part III.D.
176. See GRoss I, supra note 4, at 118-19.
177. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 246-47.
178. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 262. It is important to note that the recommendations that the NBRC finally agreed upon were hardly unanimous, passing by a narrow 54 vote. See Review Commission Recommends Sweeping Reforms, COM. LENDING LITIG.
NEWS, VOl. 10, No. 12, Oct. 31, 1997. As a result, many in Congress seem reluctant to
embrace some of the proposed reforms. See id.
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b); NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 263.
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"[I]t is all too clear that after thirteen years' experience with the disposable income requirement, courts seem no closer to sharing a collective
view of what constitutes 'reasonably necessary expenses' than they were
at the inception."' 180 Developing a more rigid process with no variation
between districts would curtail the power of local bankruptcy judges to
implement local standards that tend to reflect each judge's personal views
on the value of repayment. 18 1 In turn, with a national standard for the
amount debtors must pay their unsecured creditors, local bankruptcy attorneys would be limited to putting debtors into Chapter 13 only if their
182
ability to pay met a realistic minimum.
The change would also thus restrain attorneys from haphazardly directing a client toward Chapter 13 with an unrealistic budget. Consequently, not only would some subjectivity be taken away from local
bankruptcy officials, but consumer bankruptcy attorneys would also be
bound by a national standard.
Another change some critics have proposed to curtail the discrepancies
from district to district is to mandate that federal rather than state exemption laws apply in all cases. 183 Indeed, the NBRC recommended uniform
bankruptcy exemptions in its report to Congress. 184 In the current "optout" scheme, 85 because thirty-five states choose not to allow their citizens the option of applying the federal exemptions, exemption laws vary
greatly from state to state. 186 Although the proposal to create uniform
bankruptcy exemptions has received mixed reviews from consumer advocates, it is one of the few NBRC consumer bankruptcy recommendations
supported by the consumer credit industry, albeit to a limited degree.' 87
180. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 263-64. The report lists numerous items that
vary by district as to whether they are necessary or not, including "[o]rthodontia, piano
lessons, college tuition, home repairs, dry cleaning, newspapers, tithing, utility payments,
and food allocations." Id. at 264.
181. See id. at 266 (noting that the national policy would attempt to alleviate the local
value judgments "that differ widely even from judge to judge or trustee to trustee in the
same district").
182. See id. at 268.
183. See GRoss I, supra note 4, at 246.
184. See NBRC Report, supra note 9.
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994); ALCES & HOWARD, supra note 49, at 77.
186. See William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The "Opt-Out" as a Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 149, 180 (1997). For example, Florida and Texas, two particularly debtorfriendly states, place no monetary limit on the amount of homestead exemption an individual may claim, but rather regulate by amount of land. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; TEX
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1998). Thus, in those states, to the extent a
debtor owns the prescribed minimum amount of land, which in Texas can be up to 400
acres per family if rural, she may exempt a multi-billion dollar mansion. By contrast, Tennessee, another state that has opted out of the federal exemption scheme, allows a maximum homestead exemption of only $7,500 for joint debtors. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2301 (1980).
187. See Review Panel's Consumer Proposals 'Miss Mark,' Credit Union Group Asserts,
BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, Jan. 7, 1998 (noting one group of creditors' support for uniform
federal exemptions, but belief that the NBRC's levels of $40,000 to $100,000 are "overly
generous to debtors").
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In addition to specific national standards for managing particular substantive aspects of the bankruptcy such as determining payments to unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 payment plans and creating mandatory
federal property exemptions, the National Bankruptcy Conference has
suggested that the Attorney General establish a national policy for the
general administration of bankruptcy cases. 188 "[L]ocal variation has become too extensive and bankruptcy practice and procedures too different,
so that some centralization now appears desirable."'1 89 Had the Conference's recommendation been followed in the 1994 amendments to the
Code, the Attorney General would have implemented national policies
controlling such routine bankruptcy affairs as administration of assets in
cases and financial and administrative reporting requirements. 190
C.

MAKING CHAPTER

13

MORE ENTICING

Many critics of the current Chapter 13 feel that rather than repealing
the chapter or forcing debtors into it, it should be amended to provide a
greater incentive for debtors to attempt to repay rather than liquidate
their debts. 191 The NBRC panel discussions crystallized the issue:
The [NBRC] believed that the purpose of bankruptcy reform should
be to encourage individual debtors to file for Chapter 13 rather than
Chapter 7 so that those who are able to can repay at least a portion
of the debt owed to creditors.... The problem becomes whether we
force some debtors192into Chapter 13 or provide incentives for them to
do so voluntarily.
Bankruptcy Judge Robert Ginsberg, one of the NBRC's nine members,
agrees with the "incentives" approach: "If we want to encourage the use
of Chapter 13, we ought to do that through rewards... . It would be
193
better to use the carrot than the stick."'
In the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress attempted
to move in this direction by adding certain incentives such as increasing
the available debt ceiling'194 and implementing and clarifying certain
188. See The National Bankruptcy Conference's Code Review Project, Reforming the
Bankruptcy Code, Final Report, Revised Edition, at 11 (May 1, 1997) [hereinafter NBC
Report].
189. Id. at 12.
190. See id. at 11.
191. The NBRC rejected a plan to force some debtors into Chapter 13, instead recommending several amendments to the chapter to make it more appealing.
192. House Judiciary Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Review Commission's Report,
BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, Dec. 1, 1997 (citing Brady C. Williamson, chairman of the

commission).
193. See Review Commission Recommends Sweeping Reforms, supra note 178. However, despite the NBRC majority's decision to pursue an "incentives-based" approach" to
reforming Chapter 13, Judge Ginsberg also notes that because the proposals were adopted
by a 5-4 vote, "this close vote alerts Congress that this is an area of serious debate." Id.
194. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified
in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)) (increasing the amounts a debtor may owe and still be able to file
Chapter 13 to $250,000 maximum for unsecured debts and $750,000 maximum for secured
debts).
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home mortgage protections. 195 However, the National Bankruptcy Conference had recommended other changes to Congress, which were not
included in the 1994 amendments, such as (1) specifically authorizing the
debtor to be able to avoid transfers; 196 (2) restricting the prohibition on
the modification of mortgages to purchase money mortgages secured
197
solely by real property that is the debtor's principal place of residence;
(3) entitling a debtor to strip any lien, including one against he principal
place of residence; 198 and (4) allowing educational loans, which currently
are not dischargeable for seven years until after they are granted, to be
dischargeable.' 99 Despite following only several of the Conference's recommendations with the 1994 amendments, however, most scholars agree
that Congress took a step in the right direction by trying to make Chapter
13 more favorable to debtors.2 00 The following outlines other changes
that bankruptcy reformists have proposed:
1. Preserving the "Superdischarge"
One reform proposed by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA) embraces the Chapter 13 "superdischarge."'20' The "superdischarge" refers to the broader discharge a
debtor can receive under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7.202 "The ability of Chapter 13 debtors to discharge almost any debt through their
plans was an important ingredient in the recipe for making Chapter 13 an
attractive alternative to Chapter 7. However, this superdischarge has
been eroded through years of amendments. ' 20 3 Thus, receiving a broader
discharge in Chapter 13 is not the incentive for debtors to enter into repayment plans that it once was. 20 4 The proposal urges Congress to preserve the "superdischarge," retaining non-dischargeable status on only a
select few debts.20 5 Likewise, the NBRC included retention of the
195. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified
in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)) (ensuring that debtors are given an opportunity to cure mortgage
defaults until a foreclosure sale has taken place).
196. See NBC Report, supra note 188, at 193.
197. See id. at 194.
198. See id. at 195.
199. See id. at 196.
200. See, e.g., GRoss I, supra note 4, at 119.
201. See ABI Group Recommends Reforms Including Expanding Discharge, CoNSUMER BANKR. NEWS, June 19, 1997 [hereinafter ABI Group].

202. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994); GRoss I, supra note 4, at 246.
203. ABI Group, supra note 201.
204. See The Commission's Consumer Bankruptcy Recommendations, CONSUMER
BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1997. "The Chapter 13 superdischarge presents 'a perfect example
of what happens when you take the original law and, by little bills, chip away at it. Take
away one tooth at a time and you don't think it's so bad, but you're still going to be toothless."' Id. (quoting bankruptcy attorney Charles M. Tatelbaum).
205. In fact, the NACBA proposal would go beyond simply keeping the "superdischarge." It suggests that the process actually be reversed with respect to student loans,
which are currently non-dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994); Commission's
Consumer Bankruptcy Recommendations, supra note 204. The American Bankruptcy Institute has similarly recommended that Chapter 13 debtors should be allowed to discharge
student loans. See ABI Group, supra note 201.
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"superdischarge" as one of its recommendations for reforming Chapter
13, stating, "[T]his provision encourages voluntary Chapter 13 filings,
more distributions to the creditor body as a whole, and economic rehabilitation of the debtor through improved budget practices and a fresher
start. '20 6 However, many critics of the "superdischarge" believe on public policy and pragmatic grounds that individual debtors should be entitled to the same discharge in any chapter as long as the requirements of
that particular chapter are met. 20 7 These sentiments notwithstanding,
however, the "superdischarge" is undeniably a keen tool for enticing
debtors to undertake Chapter 13 repayments plans.
2.

Creating Mandatory Credit Report Distinction

Another proposal espoused by the NBRC would require that credit
agencies distinguish Chapter 13 filings from Chapter 7 filings on credit
reports. 20 8 Some debtors file Chapter 13 believing that they will receive a
more favorable credit rating than from a Chapter 7.209 However, credit
reporting agencies usually do not report a Chapter 13 filing differently
than a Chapter 7 filing. 210 In fact, not only is Chapter 13 usually indistinguishable from Chapter 7 on credit reports, Chapter 7 is often displayed
more favorably. 211 "One of the ironies of the current bankruptcy system
is that debtors who try to repay their debts in Chapter 13 may have worse12
credit histories than those who quickly discharge debts in Chapter 7."2
This proposal, which appears to be the most widely supported of the
NBRC's recommendations, would amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act
so that debtors who choose to repay under Chapter 13 would have their
bankruptcies reported differently from those who do not.2 13 The goal of
the change, if not to make Chapter 13 more favorable, is at least to ensure that Chapter 13 shares a level playing field with Chapter 7 in assuring debtors that they will be able to receive post-discharge credit.
3. Establishing Credit Rehabilitation Programs
In addition to having Chapter 13 noted on credit reports, the NBRC
further seeks to ensure that Chapter 13 debtors obtain credit as readily as
Chapter 7 debtors by encouraging Chapter 13 trustees to establish credit
rehabilitation programs. 214 "These programs, through the use of 'credit
liaisons,' help Chapter 13 debtors to assess their future credit needs and
match that consumer with an appropriate credit grantor to obtain credit
206. NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 291.
207. See id. at 288.
208. See id. at 291.
209. See AWFOD, supra note 16, at 34.
210. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 291.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 292.
214. See id. at 293; see also discussion of debtor-assistance programs, infra note 271 and
accompanying text.
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at more appropriate rates. A credit rehabilitation program also might
help debtors obtain, interpret, and update their credit records. '2 15 For
debtors to easily be able to obtain post-discharge credit would make
Chapter 13 repayment a more attractive alternative. 216 Credit rehabilitation programs have already been implemented by several trustees, but
"the uncertain authority to expend funds to run these programs prevents
more widespread development of credit rehabilitation. '2 17 Thus, the
NBRC recommends that these programs be explicitly recognized in order
to receive guidance and obtain the appropriate funding and support. 218
4. Making Default Discharges Available
Another reform urged by both the NBRC and the NACBA to make
Chapter 13 more attractive addresses the characteristic conversion of a
Chapter 13 case into a Chapter 7 if the debtor strays from the payment
plans. 219 The NACBA's proposal would affect primarily debtors who
would have qualified for a "no-asset" Chapter 7, but filed under Chapter
13 nevertheless. 22 0 If such a debtor is unable to complete payments,
rather than facing the alternative of a costly conversion to Chapter 7 or
having her case dismissed, the trustee would move to have the case
closed. 22 1 Then, if the debtor could show (1) that she would have qualified for a "no-asset" Chapter 7, or (2) that she has paid the unsecured
creditors enough to meet the "best interests" test, then the debtor will
automatically receive a Chapter 7 discharge. 222 Proponents of this default discharge argue that it would make Chapter 13 more enticing for
debtors who would otherwise have no assets to lose by filing a Chapter 7,
allowing them to accomplish repayment without the fear of facing an expensive conversion to Chapter 7 if they should fail to make payments
under the Chapter 13 plan. 223 The NBRC's proposal differs from that of
the NACBA only in that NBRC recommends that such cases be converted to Chapter 7, which would not necessarily result in a Chapter 7
discharge per se. 224 Some political officials have criticized the default discharge for providing "no asset" debtors who are in Chapter 13 with no
incentive to make payments, knowing that failure to do so would only
result in an automatic discharge of debts under Chapter 7.225 Others
have rebutted this argument however, by attesting that most no-asset
215. NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 293.
216. See Karen L. Gilman, FinalReport Due Soon; Code Review Commission's Proposals Spark Controversy, BANKR. STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 4 (referring to credit rehabilitation as one of the "positive incentives" created by the proposals).
217. Id. at 294.
218. See id.
219. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 273; ABI Group, supra note 201.
220. See ABI Group, supra note 201. The American Bankruptcy Institute has also recommended this type of default discharge. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 273.
224. See id.
225. See NBRC Report, supra note 9, at 291 (dissent).
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debtors who file under Chapter 13 do so to obtain some benefit of the
Chapter 13 discharge other than the mere discharge of indebtedness that
Chapter 7 could provide, and thus, the "built-in" incentive to pay would
remain.
D.

MAKING CHAPTER

13

MANDATORY TO CERTAIN DEBTORS

Despite the difficulty most debtors encounter with handling a Chapter
13 plan, creditors urged the NBRC to recommend an income-based
formula, or "needs test," that would determine whether bankruptcy
would preclude debtors with sufficient income from filing Chapter 7.226
The Commission ultimately rejected the proposal. 227 However, because
of public perception that Chapter 7 is a free lunch for debtors, several
legislators have proposed legislation that would force certain debtors into
Chapter 13 if they meet income requirements. 228 The legislation, which
came "[w]ith the ink barely dry on the report," basically "gave the cold
shoulder to the [NBRC's] proposal on consumer bankruptcies. '' 229 The
proposals reflect many congressional members' reluctance to support the
NBRC report because they feel it addresses only consumer issues, and
because it contained a "lengthy and strong dissent" from "the highly regarded federal appeals judge, Edith Jones. '2 30 Additionally, many members of Congress refuse to rely heavily on the NBRC Report because of
the narrow margin (5-4) by which most of the recommendations were
231
passed.
Thus, the consumer credit lobby and many public officials support this
course of action despite the NBRC majority's consideration of this option
and ultimate rejection of it as a positive means of reform. 232 The pressure
for the legislation comes not only from the strong creditor lobby, headed
226. See Christine Dugas, Bankruptcy Reform Plan Stirs Debate, USA TODAY, Oct. 20,
1997, at B1.
227. See id.
228. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 106th Cong.; The Responsible
Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong.; see also House Bill Would Restrict Chapter 7 Access,
CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1997; Who Will Lead the Charge of Bankruptcy Reform?, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1997. These proposals, which directly conflict
with NBRC's recommendations, have angered some bankruptcy experts. See Dugas, supra
note 226, at B1. "If you create a commission, you would do well to debate its proposals.... I think these congressmen decided to pre-empt the debate." Id. (quoting New York
Law School Professor Karen Gross).
229. Senators Welcome Commission, Reject Report, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 20,
1997.
230. Id. (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Orrin Hatch, R-Utah).
One of Judge Jones's primary points of contention was with the majority's refusal to adopt
national "means testing" that would force certain debtors to undertake repayment plans.
See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
231. See Consumer Bankruptcy on Center Stage: NBRC Delivers Report, Congress
Hears From Creditors, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1997 (noting that "[b]ecause
the fights during the Commission meetings were so heated, many think the Commissioners
didn't agree on anything in this area [of consumer bankruptcy]") [hereinafter Center
Stage].
232. See id.
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mostly by the major credit card companies and the credit "service providers," such as Visa USA and MasterCard, but also from individuals and
consumer groups who feel that the default rate and subsequent Chapter 7
filings ultimately hurt those who do not default on their debts. 233 The
beliefs are supported, if not promulgated, by the credit industry, which
reports that bankruptcy "cost each U.S. household nearly $400 in higher
prices and interest charges [in 1997]."234

The idea of keeping some debtors from filing Chapter 7, and thus making their only option to file a Chapter 13, is not completely foreign to the
present scheme; indeed, a comparable provision currently exists in the
Bankruptcy Code under the rubric of "substantial abuse. ' 235 Under section 707(b), the court may "dismiss a case ...

if it finds that the granting

of relief would be a substantialabuse of the provisions of this chapter. '236
In effect, this provision empowers bankruptcy judges to dismiss a Chapter
7 case if the debtor has sufficient excess future income to fund a Chapter
13 plan that would repay a substantial portion of her unsecured debts. 2 37

Despite this discretionary ability of bankruptcy officials to keep certain
debtors from filing Chapter 7, many critics believe that the standard
should be stricter and more uniformly enforced. 238
One proposed plan would force bankruptcy debtors into Chapter 13 if
they meet certain income maximums and debt minimums.2 39 Republican
Representative Bill McCollum of Florida, and Democratic Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia, proposed a bill that would require all
bankruptcy debtors who earned above a certain amount to submit to a
"needs test. ' 240 If the debtor had enough to repay at least twenty percent
of her unsecured debts over five years (after subtracting living expenses),
then the debtor would be prohibited from filing Chapter 7.24 1 The result
of such a plan would be to eliminate certain debtors' ability to choose
among chapters, essentially forcing debtors seeking bankruptcy into
Chapter 13 if they do not meet the "needs test. '2 42 Proponents of a national, objective "needs testing," including the four dissenting members
233. See id. (quoting Rep. John Conyers Jr. as saying, "The lobbying has been
incredible.").
234. Kelly Smith, New Ways to Cut Americans' Debt, MONEY, Nov. 1997, at 32.

235. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).

236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. See, e.g., In re Haffner, 198 B.R. 646 (Bankr. R.I. 1996).
238. See, e.g., Grassley Sounds Themes for Reform (They Include Attorney's Fees!),
BANKR. CT. DEC. NEWS AND COMMENT, Oct. 28, 1997 [hereinafter Grassley].
239. See The Responsible Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997);
Saul Hansell, Battle Emerging on How to Revise Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,

1997, at 1.

240. See H.R. 2500; Hansell, supra note 239, at 1; Patricia Lamiell, Creditors Push for
Bankruptcy Reform, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Lamiell, Bankruptcy Reform]. Most of the "needs testing" proposals of H.R. 2500 have been incorporated into H.R. 3150, for which Reps. Boucher and McCollum are co-sponsors.
241. See H.R. 2500; Patricia Lamiell, Changes in Bankruptcy Law Urged: Creditors
Pushing to Make it Harderfor Consumers to File, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 1995,
at D5 [hereinafter Lamiell, Changes in Bankruptcy].
242. See Lamiell, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 240, at D5.
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of the NBRC, argue that "bankruptcy filings have become a matter of
choice rather than a matter of necessity. ' 243 They urge that such testing
is necessary to limit Chapter 7 only to those debtors who truly cannot

repay in Chapter 13.244
In addition to the McCollum-Boucher bill, Republican Senator Charles
Grassley of Iowa, and Democratic Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois,
sponsored a similar consumer bankruptcy reform bill, which, like the McCollum-Boucher bill, would move consumer bankruptcy toward a "needs
based" system. 245 The bill proposes to supplant the word "substantial" in
the "substantial abuse" language of section 707(b), with a list of factors
that a bankruptcy judge could look to in order to dismiss a case or convert it into a Chapter 7.246 In effect, the proposal would allow bankruptcy
judges to force a Chapter 7 debtor into Chapter 13 (or entirely dismiss
the case) if the debtor could repay at least twenty percent of her un247
secured debts.
Another bill in support of "needs testing" was sponsored by Republi248
can Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania.
The bill would prohibit debtors from seeking Chapter 7 relief if [(1)]
their monthly total income exceeds 75 percent of the national median family income for a family of equal size, [(2)] their projected
monthly net income exceeds 50 [percent] and [(3)] their projected
monthly net income is sufficient to repay 20 percent
of the claims of
249
unsecured nonpriority creditors over five years.
Under the bill, "national median family income" is derived from Census
Bureau information, "monthly total income" is the average monthly income received by the debtor in the six-month period preceding the filing
of bankruptcy, and "projected monthly net income" is current monthly
total income minus expenses, including average monthly payments to
250
creditors secured and priority creditors.
243. Review Commission Recommends Sweeping Reforms, supra note 178.
244. See id.
245. See Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. Incidentally,
the bill proposed by Senator Grassley addresses the attorney's fees issue discussed supra,
Part III.A. Commenting on this aspect of the bill, Sen. Grassley said, "It seems to me,

from the reports I receive from around the country, that attorneys are using of the assets of
the bankruptcy estate without really contributing very much. And attorney's fees are paid
ahead of-and at the expense of-schools, workers and children entitled to child support."

Grassley, supra note 238.
246. See S.1301; Sens. Grassley, Durbin Introduce Bill to Decrease Number of Bank-

ruptcy Cases, BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, Oct. 23, 1997. Revealing which side of the creditor/
debtor struggle he stands on, Senator Grassley, when introducing the bill, announced,
"Those who don't want to take personal responsibility for their debts need to get the
message: the free ride is over." Id.
247. See 143 Cong. Rec. § 10882-03, § 10885 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); Senators Welcome Commission, Reject Report, supra note 229.
248. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 106th Cong. (1998).

249. New Bankruptcy Bills Promise Something for Everybody,
Feb. 26, 1998 (numerals added).

NEWS,

250. See id.
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The bills supporting "needs testing" for consumer bankruptcy debtors
are based largely on proposals endorsed by Judge Edith Jones of the 5th
Circuit, who dissented from the NBRC's recommendations. 251 Judge
Jones considered five different options for means testing that could be
implemented into the bankruptcy system. 252 First, Congress could amend
section 707(b) to require a court to dismiss or convert a case if the debtor
can repay a portion of her debts.2 53 This is essentially the approach taken
by the Grassley-Durbin bill. 254 Second, a debtor with an income above a
pre-determined minimum could be forced to subject herself to an audit
before being able to file Chapter 7.255 Third, Congress could specify an
income ceiling, and if a debtor's income exceeded that ceiling, the debtor
would have to establish extraordinary circumstances to rebut a presumption that she is ineligible for Chapter 7.256 Fourth, if a debtor is able to
repay a pre-determined minimum level of unsecured debt in five years,
then that debtor would be automatically channeled into Chapter 13.257
And fifth, a debtor could be forced into Chapter 13 if her income exceeds
258
average costs of living in the area.
Opponents of "needs testing," however, assert that its rigid requirements do not "account for individual differences, such as regional variations in the cost of living and the consideration of arrearages in
determining the ability to repay. ' 259 This argument rests primarily on the
basis that such a system of inflexible guidelines and rules would fail to
meet the particular needs of individual debtors, which can be taken into
account in administering the current scheme at the local level.
Other critics of a "needs-based" system argue that such a system essentially rewards debtors who run up the most debt with the greatest inability to repay it. If only those debtors with sufficient income are forced to
repay their debts in Chapter 13, then such a proposal creates incentives to
have a high ratio of debt to income, thus being able to erase the debts in
Chapter 7. Therefore, the proposal to make Chapter 13 mandatory for a
debtor who has sufficient income and minimal debts essentially rewards
irresponsible debtors who run up significant amounts in debt compared
to income, allowing them to discharge the debt in Chapter 7. The proposal essentially punishes more responsible debtors by forcing them to re251. See Commissioner Recommends Means-Testing for Chapter 7 Debtors, CONSUMER
BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1997.

252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (proposing to
strike the word "substantial" in the "substantial abuse" provision of § 707(b) and replace it
with a list of actions that would constitute an abuse of Chapter 7, including filing Chapter 7
with sufficient income to have undertaken a Chapter 13 repayment plan).
255. See Commissioner Recommends Means-Testing for Chapter 7 Debtors, supra note
251.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. House Judiciary Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Review Commission's Report,
supra note 192.
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pay their debts in a payment plan under Chapter 13, while creating a
great incentive for debtors to accumulate debts prior to filing to put them
over the0 threshold amount so that they can have the option of liquidating
26
them.
The proposal to force debtors into Chapter 13 has also been attacked
by critics asserting that it would create a two-tier bankruptcy scheme that
would treat the unemployed more favorably than the employed and the
poor more favorably than the wealthy. As a result, those who cannot pay
are allowed to discharge their debts, while those who can pay are forced
into "debt labor." Critics argue that such a system inhibits a healthy capitalistic economy. One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is to promote risk-taking, which, in turn promotes entrepreneurial spirit. Risktaking activity spurs commerce and energizes the American economy.
"A functional consumer bankruptcy system is essential to a well-operating capitalist system. '261 A major criticism of the proposed plan is that it
could discourage those with significant income-those who may be the
most likely to take business risk-from putting their assets on the line,
knowing that if the venture fails they will be imprisoned by a three to
five-year payment plan.
Despite the many arguments against forcing debtors into Chapter
13,262 the proposed "needs-based" bankruptcy system has garnered considerable support from Congress. To force certain debtors into Chapter
13 under the current bankruptcy scheme, however, given the current failure rate and lack of assistance provided to debtors, would be to punish
debtors with plans they cannot complete and a lifestyle they do not know
how to maintain.
E. PREVENTING INDEBTEDNESS BEFORE IT OCCURS: INTERVENTION
AND ASSISTANCE

Despite the currently healthy American economy, the number of personal bankruptcies filed increases annually.2 63 "Financial experts say it is
a paradox that bankruptcies are soaring when unemployment is low and
the economy appears to be booming. Many attribute the increase to
260. See Center Stage, supra note 231. Discussing this incentive one "needs testing"
proposal creates, one lawyer noted:
Think about that. That means that if you just make the twenty percent
threshold, you've got just enough debt that if you devoted all your income to
creditors for twenty-five years, you could pay back all of your debt. So unless you've got more debt than you can pay back in twenty-five years, you've
got to be an indentured servant for five years. What kind of incentive does
that give me? I've got to go pile up some more debt! Id.
261. Lamiell, Changes in Bankruptcy, supra note 241, at D1 (quoting Norma Hammes
of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys).
262. Two additional arguments against forcing debtors into Chapter 13 include (1) the
psychological importance of having the choice between chapters when faced with filing
bankruptcy and (2) the constitutional prohibition against peonage. See supra Part III.B.
263. See Lamiell, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 240, at 4. "Personal bankruptcies
rose 28 percent in 1996 to 1.13 million, and are expected to reach 1.3 million for 1997,
according to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts." Id.
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companies providing credit so readily to consumers. '264
Issuers of credit cards seem to be leading the charge of this consumer
credit onslaught. "Is there anybody in America that hasn't been deluged
with opportunities for credit cards?" 265 The consumer credit industry
routinely, if inadvertently, extends credit to those who are not credit worthy. 266 "We encourage consumer indebtedness. Buy now, pay later.
You've got ten credit cards. You're just who we're looking for to have
eleven. '267 Moreover, many debtors acquire credit not as an indulgence,
but as a means to keep "their heads above water." For many consumer
debtors, particularly those with little or no money-management education, obtaining credit may seem like the only way to avoid bankruptcy;
some feel that the only way they can make payments on prior obligations
is by obtaining more credit. "The use of credit has become an addiction
for many people in this country-as serious as drugs, alcohol, gambling,
'268
or gluttony.
Indisputably, the rise in consumer debt correlates to the rise in consumer bankruptcies. 269 However, some economic analysts believe that
the perception that Americans are in the midst of a tremendous spending
and borrowing binge is inaccurate. 2 70 Nevertheless, most bankruptcy theorists do agree that no one factor has caused the increase in consumer
bankruptcy filings, although the NBRC noted a study that found that the
proliferation of legal gambling had the "single biggest effect" on the increase in consumer bankruptcies. 27 1 Most attribute the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings to a combination of factors, such as "financially
illiterate consumers, too many consumers living on the edge, a decrease
in wages in terms of real dollars, divorces and uninsured medical bills,
'2 72
and creditors going deeper into the risk pool.
Many believe that because the enormous increase in consumer bankruptcy filings is a multi-dimensional problem, it requires a multi-faceted
solution that would attack the problem not only at the bankruptcy level,
but at both fronts - creditor and debtor.2 73 This innovative approach
264. Hope Viner Samborn, Going for Broke: Soaring Bankruptcies Prompt Calls for
New Repayment Plan, 82 A.B.A. J. 16, Sept. 1996.
265. Center Stage, supra note 231.
266. See, e.g., American Express Travel Related Services v. Dorsey, 120 B.R. 592
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (reporting a case in which creditors extended more than $100,000
in unsecured credit to a debtor who had been unemployed for ten years and whose only
income was social security payments).
267. Center Stage, supra note 231.
268. House Judiciary Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Review Commission's Report,
supra note 192 (quoting Republican Rep. George W. Gekas from Pensylvania).
269. See id.
270. Bankruptcy Judges' Meeting Focuses on Review Commission Recommendations,

BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, Nov. 6, 1997 (citing Dr. Lawrence Chimerine of the Economic
Strategy Institute).
271. See House Judiciary Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Review Commission's Report, supra note 192.
272. Bankruptcy Judges' Meeting Focuses on Review Commission Recommendations,

supra note 270.
273. See id.
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encourages assistance at the debtor level and intervention at the creditor
level. Rather than simply attacking bankruptcy itself, this theory advocates curing indebtedness before it becomes a bankruptcy-level problem.
At the assistance level, these types of plans propose to help debtors
avoid or alleviate indebtedness through consumer education regarding
money management. 274 The realistic goals of these plans are not necessarily to instill financial savvy into the average consumer, but merely to
provide individuals fundamental instruction and give them the tools necessary for achieving the simplest money-management tasks, such as staying within an elementary budget and balancing a checkbook.2 75 Not only
would this increased education help newly informed debtors stay out of
bankruptcy, but it would also help them better understand how to man2 76
age a Chapter 13 repayment plan if they find bankruptcy is necessary.
A similar cry for reform at the assistance level also attempts to help consumers escape the "downward spiral" of debt many become involved
in. 277 Many bankruptcy scholars feel that countless consumer bankruptcy
filings could be avoided if debtors had received early referrals to consumer credit assistance agencies, which counsel debtors on money management, and perhaps more importantly, help them negotiate with
creditors. If creditors, as well as bankruptcy officials, attorneys, and administrators provided greater assistance to pre-bankruptcy debtors in the
form of frequent referrals to these services, much of the indebtedness
that ultimately leads to bankruptcy could be evaded.
At the intervention level these types of plans also focus to a large degree on debtor education, but here the burden is on the credit industry to
fund and monitor the programs rather than on the Trustee. 278 Lenders
"need to help fund programs to educate bankrupt borrowers on the use
of credit. '2 79 Furthermore, creditors are urged make more concessions,
such as decreasing interest rates and forgiving non-payment of service
2 80
fees, which would assist many debtors with making regular payments.
Requiring creditors to fund debtor education programs would undoubt274. See Henry Hildebrand, III, Education:A Requirement for Bankruptcy Relief?, 31
AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
May 1997, available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File. Bankruptcy Districts in North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and other states have already implemented
such programs at the initiative of the Trustee. Id. at 2.
275. See id. The program in place in the Middle District of North Carolina, for example, consists of classes and "debtor counselors," and "focuses on methods of budgeting,
improving existing budgeting skills, economic goal setting, basic information on credit laws,
debtor's rights and creditor evaluation skills." Id. Similarly, an Ohio program teaches such
topics as "home purchasing, domestic budgeting, automobile acquisition, debtor's rights
and credit reporting." Id. at 4.
276. See id.
277. See Bankruptcy Judges' Meeting Focuses on Review Commission Recommendations, supra note 270.
278. See Hildebrand, supra note 274, at 6 n.7 (noting that under the current scheme one
of the main problems with implementing debtor education programs is lack of funding).
279. Lamiell, Changes in Bankruptcy, supra note 241, at D1 (noting the opinion of
Karen Gross who teaches bankruptcy law at New York Law School).
280. See Bankruptcy Judges' Meeting Focuses on Review Commission Recommendations, supra note 271.
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edly promote a cause-and-effect relationship; creditors would, if unintentionally, face a larger pool of qualified debtors. This theory coincides
with the belief shared by many bankruptcy theorists that Congress should
intervene to demand tighter underwriting by creditors. 281 As long as
creditors continue to "dig deeper into the risk pool for borrowers," the
number of consumer bankruptcy filings will continue to increase. 282
Democratic Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York, has proposed a
bill that attempts to attack this problem of creditors being too willing to
extend credit.2 83 At its core, the bill proposes to discourage reckless

lending practices by amending § 502(b) and increasing the number of disallowed claims. 2 84 "For example, claims would be disallowed if the credit

was granted to a debtor already in financial trouble or incurred in a gambling casino. '2 85 However, many criticize such plans to implement tighter
regulations on the issuance of credit because of the belief that they are
too rigid and paternalistic, and would leave many responsible debtors unable to obtain credit when truly needed. Nevertheless, requiring the
credit industry to shoulder the burden of increased regulation and debtor
education would almost unquestionably reduce the number of consumer
bankruptcy filings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Simply put, under the current bankruptcy scheme, few bankruptcy
debtors should ever pursue Chapter 13 given their high likelihood of failure, particularly with Chapter 7 as such an attractive alternative. Unless a
debtor is especially suited for undertaking a Chapter 13 payment plan, or
unless Chapter 13 is revised so that it is more advantageous to debtors, a
lawyer should not steer a client in that direction. If a bankruptcy judge or
trustee feels that the law should encourage debtors to undertake Chapter
13 repayment as opposed to Chapter 7 liquidation, then that judge or
trustee should petition for a change in bankruptcy law rather than creating informal, local policy. As long as Chapter 13 goes unchanged, most
bankruptcy debtors would be ill-advised to file under Chapter 13. Most
political officials, their constituents, and bankruptcy law scholars, however, feel that repayment of one's debts should be encouraged, and repayment is less likely to occur under Chapter 7. Therefore, the
Bankruptcy Code should be amended to make Chapter 13 a more attractive alternative, encouraging debtors to choose for themselves to attempt
repayment plans. Similarly, the Code should force bankruptcy debtors
into Chapter 13 in only the most egregious cases, although members of
281. See id.
282. Changes in Bankruptcy Law Urged: Creditorspushing to make it harderfor consumers to file, supra note 241, at D1 (quoting Norma Hammes of the National Association
of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys).
283. See Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Accountability Act of 1998, H.R. 3146,
106th Cong.
284. See id.
285. See New Bankruptcy Bills Promise Something for Everybody, supra note 249.
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Congress seem to disagree, proposing plans that mandate national "needs
testing." Allowing debtors to continue to be able to choose between two
different alternatives, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, remains an important
aspect of the Bankruptcy Code that often goes overlooked.
Uniform, national standards are not necessarily a bankruptcy evil. Indeed, greater uniformity in bankruptcy administration is needed, particularly regarding the enforcement of rules and application of flexible
standards. Current discrepancies from district to district and from judge
to judge can often "penalize" debtors for filing in a certain area. This
"local legal culture" can lead to harsh results, causing a Chapter 7 debtor
in one district to have a case dismissed or converted to a Chapter 13,
while a debtor with similar income and debt levels in another district receives a discharge. Such disparity increases the complexity and inequity
of Chapter 13, and could be remedied by implementing uniform national
standards based on conclusive, empirical information.
Finally, to further remedy the ailing Chapter 13 repayment initiative,
educational programs should be established at the local level to promote
consumer awareness regarding debt management. These programs could
be funded, at least in part, by credit issuers. As for the credit industry,
lenders and other credit issuers should bear responsibility of undertaking
a more exacting screening process before approving an individual as a
debtor. To a degree this process could be based on passage of a creditorissued debt-management exam, or some other device to ensure that the
individual can manage indebtedness. While federal regulations creating
mandatory restrictions on credit issuance may be unnecessary, much of
the responsibility should nevertheless rest with creditors who too often
irresponsibly extend credit to those who cannot manage it.
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